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LINGUISTIC CONFUSION IN COURT: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE FORENSIC 
SCIENCES 
Jonathan J. Koehler* 
INTRODUCTION 
When fingerprint evidence was approved for admission in 
U.S. courts in 1911,1 the approving court noted that “[e]xpert 
evidence is admissible when the witnesses offered as experts 
have peculiar knowledge or experience not common to the world, 
which renders their opinions, founded on such knowledge or 
experience, an aid to the court or jury in determining the 
questions at issue.”2 In other words, expert testimony is 
appropriate when a qualified witness has something to say that 
helps a fact finder in the instant case. One hundred years later, 
the sentiment expressed in Jennings appears in the Federal Rule 
of Evidence pertaining to the admissibility of expert testimony.3 
But how can we know when expert testimony is helpful rather 
than unhelpful or even harmful? 
I submit that the specific language used in court by experts 
can be the difference between testimony that is truly helpful and 
testimony that is confusing or unhelpful. This idea is particularly 
germane to scientific testimony in cases where the triers of fact 
have a limited understanding of the principles and methods from 
which the testimony derives its strength. 
                                                          
* Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. 
1 People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1081–82 (Ill. 1911). 
2 Id. at 1083. 
3 FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (stating that expert testimony is admissible when 
it “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue”). 
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This simple point, which has obvious implications for the 
law, should also be of interest to the forensic linguistics 
community. Forensic linguists are sometimes called to testify 
about document content analysis, speaker identification, and 
authorship, among other things. How, for example, should 
forensic linguists testify about their analyses of who wrote a 
particular text message? At present, forensic scientists in general, 
and forensic linguists in particular, take one of two very different 
approaches. One approach is testimony that culminates in the 
expert’s subjective source opinion. For example, those who 
practice “forensic stylistics” commonly offer their opinions 
about who wrote (or who did not write) a document after taking 
account of such stylistic characteristics as document format, 
spelling, capitalization, abbreviations, punctuation, word choice, 
and syntax.4 Among the more established forensic sciences, 
fingerprint analysis offers a similarly subjective conclusion.5 The 
second approach culminates in a quantitative statement about the 
degree of observed correspondence between an unknown target 
and a known reference. In forensic linguistics, this approach is 
favored by computational linguists because it fits well with the 
field’s tendency to identify statistical models for language use. 
However, there are few, if any, databases from which to generate 
quantitative statements. DNA analysis, which does rely on large 
databases to generate probability assessments, offers similarly 
data-driven probabilistic conclusions. For example, a DNA 
analyst will commonly report the frequency with which a 
matching DNA profile exists in a reference population (i.e., the 
“random match probability”).6  
Regardless of which approach is used at trial, there is a 
significant risk that expert testimony on scientific and technical 
matters will confuse or mislead triers of fact.7 This risk is 
particularly important whenever material is unfamiliar or 
                                                          
4 ANDRE E. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL CASES 252 (6th ed. 2013). 
5 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 139 (2009) 
(“[F]riction ridge analysis relies on subjective judgments by the examiner.”). 
6 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 862. 
7 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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complex. In these cases, the specific language used by legal 
actors may be the difference between testimony that is truly 
helpful to the trier of fact and testimony that is misleading and 
unhelpful.8 In this paper, I address issues related to how 
scientific and technical information should and should not be 
communicated in court. Because confusion in the DNA and 
fingerprint areas has been documented and is relatively common, 
my comments focus on linguistic problems in DNA and 
fingerprint expert testimony in hopes that forensic linguists can 
avoid the testimonial traps and errors that plague these forensic 
scientists. 
Section I of this paper examines DNA match statistics and 
describes the confusion that legal actors experience when dealing 
with conditional probabilities. Section II examines statistical 
inverse errors in the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case McDaniel 
v. Brown.9 Section III examines a seductive, but faulty, 
statistical assumption that commonly arises in paternity cases. 
Section IV examines the role of error rates in forensic sciences 
and concludes that identifying those error rates is particularly 
important in fields that rely on highly discriminating statistical 
techniques. Section V offers an illustration of the crucial role ill-
defined language can play in a legal proceeding. Standard and 
precise terms are recommended. The paper concludes with a 
section identifying implications for the forensic linguistics and 
authorship attribution communities. 
I. DNA MATCH STATISTICS 
When an expert testifies about DNA evidence found at a 
crime scene, the punch line is usually statistical. Specifically, 
after the expert testifies to a “match” (or inclusion) between the 
DNA profile of an evidentiary sample and the DNA profile of a 
particular individual, the strength of that match is often 
described by the random match probability (“RMP”). The RMP 
                                                          
8 The Federal Rules of Evidence require that expert testimony must 
“help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
9 McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010). 
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is a statistic that describes the frequency of a DNA profile in a 
population.10 Other things being equal, smaller RMPs (such as 
one in one billion) indicate a stronger DNA match than larger 
RMPs (such as one in one hundred) because the chance that the 
match is purely coincidental in the former instance is much less 
likely.11 
                                                          
10 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 863 (“[T]he ‘random match 
probability’ (RMP) is the probability that a randomly selected, unrelated 
individual in the relevant population would have a particular DNA profile.”). 
11 Importantly, there are at least two circumstances in which the RMP 
provides a misleading indicator of the strength of a DNA match. The first 
circumstance is when the potential source population includes close relatives 
of the putative source. The chance that a putative source will share a DNA 
profile with a close relative is usually much larger than the RMP, and 
therefore the chance of a coincidental match with the crime scene sample is 
larger as well. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE 
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 123 (1996). The second 
circumstance in which the RMP provides a misleading indicator of the 
strength of a DNA match is when the risk of laboratory error is substantially 
larger than the RMP. COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND 
THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENCES 425 (2004) (“If the 
probability of an error . . . is much greater than the probability of matching 
profiles . . . then the latter probability is effectively irrelevant to the weight 
of the evidence.”); DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC 
DNA PROFILES 35 (2005) (“If the false-match probability (ii) is judged to be 
much larger than the chance-match probability (i), then the latter probability 
is effectively irrelevant to evidential weight . . . . [I]t is not the absolute but 
the relative magnitude of the false-match to the chance-match probabilities 
that determines whether the former can be safely neglected.”); Jonathan J. 
Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability (RMP) in DNA Evidence: 
Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201 (1995) (“RMPs 
contribute little to an assessment of the diagnostic significance of a reported 
DNA match beyond that given by the false positive laboratory error rate 
when RMPs are several orders of magnitude smaller than this error rate.”); 
Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC II, 37 
JURIMETRICS J. 439, 447 (1997) (“the probative value of a DNA match is 
always limited by the chance of false positive error”); William C. Thompson 
et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA 
Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 1 (2003) (“[H]aving accurate estimates [of] 
the false positive probabilities can be crucial for assessing the value of DNA 
evidence.”). Laboratory error includes all types of error that might result in a 
reported match on a person who is not, in fact, the source of the evidentiary 
item. 
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The strength of a DNA match may also be given by a 
likelihood ratio (“LR”).12 A LR is a ratio of conditional 
probabilities that examines the probability of observing evidence 
under two competing hypotheses.13 The LR technique allows 
experts to determine how much more (or less) the evidence 
favors one hypothesis over the other. Ignoring for the time being 
the twin issues of close relatives and laboratory error identified 
in footnote 10, the LR is approximately the inverse of the RMP 
(i.e., 1/RMP).14 The numerator is approximately 1 (or 100%) 
because if the putative source is, in fact, the actual source of the 
evidentiary item, then he or she will share a common DNA 
profile with the evidentiary item.15 Similarly, if the putative 
source is not, in fact, the actual source, then he or she will not 
share a DNA profile with the true source unless he or she, by 
sheer coincidence, has the same DNA profile.16 The RMP 
captures the chance of a coincidental match and is commonly 
                                                          
12 AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 11, at 153–55. 
13 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 11, at 
31. (“The LR is the ratio of the probability of a match if the DNA in the 
evidence sample and that from the suspect came from the same person to the 
probability of a match if they came from different persons.”). 
14 Id. (“Since the probability of a match when the samples came from the 
same person is one (unless there has been a mistake), the likelihood ratio is 
simply the reciprocal of the match probability.”). 
15 This assumes, of course, that a person’s DNA profile remains constant 
across time. In rare cases, an individual’s DNA may change. See, e.g., Cai 
Wenjun, Rare Mutation Solves Murder, SHANGHAI DAILY (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/nsp/National/2012/11/12/Rare%2Bmutation%
2Bsolves%2Bmurder/ (discussing a rare mutation that aided police in 
identifying a suspect from a pair of identical twins). 
16 The chance of a coincidental match depends, in large part, on how 
many loci are examined. Today, thirteen loci are most commonly used, and 
the resultant random match probabilities are on the order of one in billions, 
trillions, and quadrillions. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., supra note 5, at 3-12; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 142 (3d ed. 2011), 
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/fjc/manual_sci_evidence.pdf; 
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, THE POTENTIAL FOR ERROR IN FORENSIC DNA 
TESTING (AND HOW THAT COMPLICATES THE USE OF DNA DATABASES FOR 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION) 6–7 (2008), available at http://www.councilfor 
responsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/H4T5EOYUZI.pdf. 
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inserted into the denominator of the LR.17 Thus, when the RMP 
is 1 in 3,000,000, the corresponding LR is often reported as 
3,000,000:1. This means that the matching DNA profile is 
3,000,000 times more likely under the hypothesis that the 
defendant is the source of the evidentiary item than under the 
hypothesis that the defendant is not the source.  
What this does not mean, however, is that the defendant is 
3,000,000 times more likely to be the source of the evidentiary 
item than not to be the source. Most people, experts included, 
would be hard-pressed to explain why this is so. But a careful 
review of the relevant conditional probabilities provides insight. 
The LR describes P(Evidence | Source) / P(Evidence | Not 
Source). However, the statement “the defendant is 3,000,000 
times more likely to be the source of the evidentiary item than 
not to be the source,” describes the posterior odds ratio 
P(Source | Evidence) / P(Not Source | Evidence). The posterior 
odds ratio is the inverse of the LR. Those who confuse the LR 
with the posterior are committing a transposition error or 
“inverse fallacy.”18 This error is no mere technicality. Just as we 
may not assume that the probability that Jack will eat a hot dog 
given that he is at the ball game (very high probability) is the 
same as the probability that Jack is at a ball game given that he 
is eating a hot dog (much lower probability), we may not 
assume that P(Source | Evidence) = P(Evidence | Source) or 
that P(Not Source | Evidence) = (Evidence | Not Source).  
Nonetheless, people often commit inverse errors when 
dealing with conditional probabilities.19 People also confuse 
                                                          
17 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 11, at 
31. 
18 D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic 
Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SERIES A 75, 77–78 (1991). 
19 Ward Cascells et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical 
Laboratory Results, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 1001 (1978) (showing 45% 
inverse errors among Harvard physicians); Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, 
Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some 
Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 58 
COGNITION 1, 25 (1996) (showing 56% inverse errors among Stanford 
students); Kaye & Koehler, supra note 18, at 77 (reviewing inversion fallacy 
data in pre-DNA mock juror studies conducted in the 1980s); Jonathan J. 
Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, 
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conditional probabilities with joint probabilities,20 and are less 
likely to engage in sound probabilistic reasoning when using 
conditional probabilities than when those probabilities are 
converted into frequency form.21 These problems may have 
significant consequences for legal cases that involve scientific 
and statistical testimony. Jurors who make these mistakes may 
believe that the RMP identifies the probability that the defendant 
is innocent. This belief is known as the “prosecutor’s fallacy.”22 
There is evidence that experts, attorneys, and other legal actors 
fall prey to this fallacy in actual cases.23 Similarly, legal actors 
fall prey to the source probability error,24 which involves 
equating the RMP with the probability that the putative source is 
not the source of the evidentiary item in question. This latter 
error is so tempting that the RMP is routinely described in court 
                                                          
Likelihood Ratios and Error Rates, 67 COLO. L. REV. 859, 877–78 (1996) 
(noting that people treat LRs much as they treat posterior odds ratios); 
William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical 
Evidence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989); Christopher R. Wolfe, 
Information Seeking on Bayesian Conditional Probability Problems: A Fuzzy-
Trace Theory Account, 8 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 85, 97 (1995) (noting 
that 77% of college students verbally confused LRs with posterior odds 
ratios). 
20 Stephen E. Edgell et al., Base Rates, Experience and the Big Picture, 
19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 21, 21 (1996); Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, 
How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 
102 PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 694 (1995). 
21 Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 19, at 25 (comparing errors among 
Stanford students and finding a 56% rate for inverse errors but only 5% rate 
when frequencies used); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, 
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s 
Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 
172–76 (1987) (noting that 22% committed inverse fallacy on blood matching 
evidence in the context of a hypothetical robbery case when the evidence was 
presented in P(E | -G) form, whereas a frequency presentation of the blood 
evidence produced inverse fallacies only 4% of time). 
22 Thompson & Schumann, supra note 21, at 171. 
23 McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 (2010); Jonathan J. 
Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34 
JURIMETRICS J. 21, 32 (1993). 
24  McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 673; AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 11, at 
81–82; Koehler et al., supra note 11, at 212. 
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opinions as the chance that someone other than the defendant is 
the source of the genetic evidence.25  
II. STATISTICAL INVERSE ERRORS: MCDANIEL V. BROWN 
Probability errors took center stage, at least in defense 
filings and an amicus brief,26 in the U.S. Supreme Court case 
McDaniel v. Brown.27 In McDaniel, Troy Brown was tried and 
convicted of a rape in Nevada largely based on DNA evidence. 
Renee Romero, a criminalist for the county, discovered semen on 
the victim’s underwear that matched Brown’s DNA profile. On 
direct exam, Romero estimated the frequency of the DNA profile 
to be “one in 3 million.”28 When the prosecutor asked “[s]o that 
means that only one in 3 million people will share the same 
genetic code?” Romero correctly answered in the affirmative.29  
The Supreme Court described Romero’s testimony on this 
matter as follows: “The State’s expert, Renee Romero, tested the 
[blood stain] and determined that the DNA matched Troy’s and 
that the probability another person from the general population 
                                                          
25 State v. Reaves, No. COA10–1246, 716 S.E.2d 441, at *3 (N.C. Ct. 
App. Oct. 4, 2011) (unpublished table decision) (“The lowest probability that 
someone other than Defendant in the North Carolina African American 
population contributed the DNA discovered on Ms. Curtis’ steering wheel 
was one in 147,000.”); State v. Timm, No. 13–11–23, 2012 WL 367589, at 
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2012) (“Mr. Weiss testified that the statistical 
probability that someone other than Timm could be the source of the DNA in 
the sperm fraction extracted from the shorts was less than one in more than 
6.5 billion.”); Murga v. State, No. 05–10–01237, 2012 WL 807081, at *2 
(Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2012) (“The third analysis showed a one in 11.1 
billion possibility that someone other than appellant had a DNA profile that 
matched appellant’s.”). 
26 Brief for 20 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. 665 (No. 08-559), reprinted 
in Erin Murphy & William C. Thompson, Common Errors and Fallacies in 
Forensic DNA Statistics: An Amicus Brief in McDaniel v. Brown, 46 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 5 (2010). 
27 McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 671. 
28 Jury Trial Transcript Day 3, September 29, 1994, State v. Brown, No. 
5833 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1994), reprinted in 2 Joint Appendix at 330, 437, 
McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. 665 (No. 08-559) [hereinafter McDaniel Transcript]. 
29 Id. at 438. 
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would share the same DNA (the ‘random match probability’) 
was only 1 in 3,000,000.”30 The Court’s characterization of Ms. 
Romero’s testimony is ambiguous. When the Court says, “the 
probability another person from the general population would 
share the same DNA . . . was only 1 in 3,000,000,”31 it might 
mean (a) the chance that any person in the general population 
(The U.S.? The world?) would share the DNA profile in 
question is 1 in 3,000,000, or (b) the frequency with which 
people in the general population share the DNA profile in 
question is 1 in 3,000,000. The latter interpretation is the correct 
interpretation of what Ms. Romero actually said,32 but one cannot 
know this from the Court’s imprecise language. The ambiguity in 
the Court’s restatement here is ironic given that a central issue 
raised by the defendant in the appeal was the use of imprecise 
language concerning the DNA evidence at trial and its impact on 
those who heard it. 
A. Source Probability Error 
In all likelihood, the prosecutor in McDaniel wanted the 
expert to state the RMP in a more dramatic fashion. That is, he 
probably wanted Romero to describe it as a source probability. 
Of course, the RMP cannot be converted to a source probability. 
But the prosecutor nonetheless attempted to extract one from 
Romero. This following exchange between the prosecutor and 
Romero ensued:  
Q: Now, as far as a—for my benefit, we’re looking at a 
one in 3 million statistic. Is there another way to show 
that statistic? In other words, what—let’s say 100 
percent—what is the likelihood that the DNA found in 
the panties is the same as the DNA found in the 
defendant’s blood? 
                                                          
30 McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 668. 
31 Id. 
32 We know that the latter interpretation is the right interpretation of 
what Romero said because she agreed with the prosecutor that the one in 
three million statistic meant that “only one in 3 million people will share the 
same genetic code.” McDaniel Transcript, supra note 28, at 438. 
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A: Paternity testing uses percentages.  
Q: Okay. 
A: Not the way forensics likes to look at it. We prefer 
the one in 3 million. 
Q: I understand that, but for just another way to look at 
it, what would that percentage be? 
A: It would be 99.99967 [sic]33 percent.34  
When the prosecutor asks “what is the likelihood that the 
DNA found in the panties is the same as the DNA found in the 
defendant’s blood?” he appears to be asking for a source 
probability. Though hard to interpret, he seems to want Ms. 
Romero to identify the probability that the DNA in the panties 
and the DNA in the defendant’s blood share a common source. 
In other words, he seems to be asking Ms. Romero to identify 
P(Defendant is the Source of the Recovered DNA | The 
Recovered DNA Matches the Defendant). Ms. Romero’s initial 
answer—“Paternity testing uses percentages”—is not responsive. 
Ms. Romero’s second answer—“we prefer the one in 3 million,” 
is odd for several reasons. First, “one in 3 million” is a 
frequency, not a percentage. This contradicts her immediately 
preceding statement about using “percentages” in paternity 
testing. Second, it is a simple matter to translate a frequency into 
a probability. Here, for example, a frequency of one in 
3,000,000 is mathematically identical to .000033%.  
When the prosecutor presses Ms. Romero further by asking 
for “another way to look at it,” the “it” transforms from an 
RMP of 1 in 3,000,000 (or .000033%) to “1 – RMP” or 
99.999967%.35 Obviously .000033% is not the same as 
99.999967%. Therefore, it is apparent that Ms. Romero was not 
referring to the RMP at all when she offered the 99.999967% 
figure.  
Having succeeded in extracting the 99.999967% source 
probability estimate from his expert, the prosecutor next attempts 
                                                          
33 According to the McDaniel transcript, Ms. Romero said “99.99967 
percent.” Id. at 458. However, she presumably meant (or said) “99.999967 
percent” which is the outcome of 100 percent minus .000033 percent. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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to get Romero to restate the one in three million RMP as the 
probability that the defendant is not the source of the DNA, i.e., 
P(Not Source | Match).  
Q: So, the—would it be fair to say, based on that that the 
chances that the DNA found in the panties—the semen in 
the panties—and the blood sample, the likelihood that it 
is not Troy Brown would be .000033? 
A: I’d prefer to refer to it as the one in 3 million. 
Q: All right. But from a mathematical standpoint, would 
that be inaccurate? 
A: Repeat the question, please. 
Q: Would it be fair, then, to say that with that 
mathematical calculation there, that the likelihood that the 
DNA extracted from the semen in the panties and the 
DNA extracted from the blood that the likelihood that it’s 
not Troy Brown, that it’s not a match is .000033? 
Mr. Lockie [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going 
to object on relevance. The witness is testifying that it’s 
not scientifically valid in her opinion. So it’s not 
relevant. 
The Court: Well, I don’t know that— 
[Mr. Smith (Prosecutor)]36: That’s just a subtraction 
problem.  
The Court: Let’s go back. I don’t think that’s what she 
said. I don’t think that’s what she said. Let’s go back a 
step and find out. I don’t think that’s what she said. 
By Mr. Smith [Prosecutor] (continuing) 
Q: Now, I understand that—and what I’m trying to do is 
make this into a percentage where I can understand it. 
And so I recognize that as far as your testing, you would 
prefer to have it as a one in 3 million, but just as another 
                                                          
36 The trial transcript indicates that Mr. Lockie (defense counsel) makes 
this comment, but it seems unlikely that he would contradict his own 
objection by stating that this is “just a subtraction problem.” Id. at 460–61. 
The statement was probably made by the prosecutor in response to defense 
counsel’s objection as indicated in the text above.  
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way of looking at it, would it be inaccurate to state it that 
way? 
A: It’s not inaccurate, no. 
Q: All right. Then in response to my question, would the 
likelihood that the semen from the DNA found in the 
panties and the blood from Troy Brown, that it’s not the 
same, would it be—the chances that they are not a match 
would be .000033? 
A: Yes. That’s the way the math comes out.  
Q: All right. 
THE COURT: Let’s make sure. It’s the same thing—it’s 
the same math just expressed differently. Is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. Exactly, your Honor.  
THE COURT: Thank you.37 
As before, Romero initially resists the prosecution’s efforts to 
turn an RMP into a source probability by stating a preference for 
expressing the DNA statistic as a frequency rather than as a 
probability. But Romero’s resistance misses the mark. As noted 
above, it makes no mathematical difference whether a frequency 
statistic is expressed as a frequency or as its equivalent 
probability (decimal) value.38 One in three million may be 
described as .00000033 or as its percentage equivalent, 
.000033%.  
What Romero should have resisted was the prosecutor’s 
attempt to convert the .000033% RMP statistic39 into a posterior 
                                                          
37 Id. at 460–62. 
38 Of course, although frequencies and their corresponding probabilities 
are mathematically equivalent, people may respond differently to the form of 
the presentation. Indeed, there is evidence that people respond differently to 
frequencies and their mathematically equivalent probabilities in the context of 
DNA statistics. See generally Jonathan J. Koehler & Laura Macchi, Thinking 
About Low-Probability Events: An Exemplar-Cuing Theory, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
540 (2004) (finding that people were less persuaded by low probability DNA 
evidence when it was presented in an exemplar-conducive way than when it 
was not). 
39 The prosecutor omits the “percent” on the .000033% RMP statistic. 
Although surely unintentional, this omission inflates the RMP from one in 
3,000,000 to one in 30,000. McDaniel Transcript, supra note 28, at 460–62. 
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probability that the matchee is not the source of the evidence. 
The conversion of an RMP into a posterior probability is not 
simply “another way of looking at it,”40 as the prosecutor 
suggested. It is a fallacious maneuver, albeit one that the 
prosecutor may not have realized was fallacious. Indeed, if one 
were to assign blame for the statistical confusion on this point, it 
must fall squarely on the shoulders of the expert witness, 
Romero. When the prosecutor committed the inverse fallacy and 
then directly asked Romero, “[W]ould it be inaccurate to state it 
that way?”41 Ms. Romero erroneously replied, “It’s not 
inaccurate, no.”42 She affirmed this error repeatedly in this 
exchange both with the prosecutor and then with the trial 
judge.43  
We should expect more from forensic science experts who 
offer statistical testimony. They must know what the inverse 
fallacy is, they must correct the error when it is made by judges 
or attorneys, and they certainly must not promote it in their own 
testimony. When experts commit the error that Ms. Romero 
committed, they elevate the risk that jurors will believe that the 
evidence is stronger than it really is.44  
                                                          
40 Id. at 461. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 462. 
43 Another noteworthy aspect of the exchange above is defense counsel’s 
objection to the prosecutor’s attempt to lure Ms. Romero into approving and 
committing a source probability error. Defense counsel objects on grounds of 
“relevance,” not misstatement of fact. Id. at 461. 
He protests that the inversion is not relevant because Romero testified 
that it’s not “scientifically valid.” Id. However, as the judge correctly notes, 
Romero did not expressly reject the inversion as scientifically invalid (as she 
should have). Instead, Romero only expressed an unjustified preference for 
expressing the RMP in a particular way. Id. 
44 Having identified this risk, I should also note that empirical studies 
with mock jurors frequently show that jurors undervalue DNA evidence 
relative to Bayesian norms. See, e.g., David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the 
Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, 4 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797, 802 tbl.1 (2007). However, the Bayesian 
norms generally ignore the role of close relatives and, more importantly, 
laboratory error. But if one assumes that jurors tend to undervalue DNA 
evidence, it is possible that source probability errors such as those made by 
Romero in McDaniel may actually increase the chance that jurors will give 
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B. Prosecutor’s Fallacy 
As egregious as Romero’s statistical testimony was, the 
prosecutor committed an even more serious error in his closing 
argument when he converted the RMP into a probability that the 
defendant is guilty. This error, which has been referred to both 
as the Ultimate Issue Error45 and, more famously, as the 
Prosecutor’s Fallacy,46 is committed when the RMP is subtracted 
from 1 and that value is offered to the jury as the probability that 
the matchee is guilty as charged. Here is what the prosecutor 
said: 
Mr. Smith [Prosecutor]: Consider the fact that, what is 
the percentage that Troy Brown didn’t commit this crime? 
Was it 75 percent? Are you 75 percent sure? Based on the 
DNA? 90 percent, 99, sometimes people use the phrase, 
I’m 99 percent sure about that. Well, in this case the 
evidence shows—how sure can you be? 99.999967 
percent sure.47 
As noted above, the probability that a defendant is innocent 
or guilty cannot be determined from the RMP alone. If this were 
true, then no other evidence in the case would be relevant, 
including evidence pertaining to the defendant’s opportunity and 
ability to commit the crime in question. At best, an extreme 
DNA RMP can provide strong proof that a particular person is 
among the small group of people who might be the source of the 
DNA evidence. But, it does not address the possibility that a 
person may be the source of the recovered DNA evidence yet not 
be responsible for the crime charged. However, when jurors are 
expressly told that the scientific evidence enables jurors to be 
“99.999967% sure” that the defendant committed a crime, jurors 
need only determine whether this percentage is sufficiently high 
                                                          
DNA evidence the weight that it is deserves. 
45 AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 11, at 82; Koehler, supra note 23, at 
31–32. 
46 See generally Thompson & Schumann, supra note 21. 
47 Jury Trial Transcript Day 4, September 30, 1994, State v. Brown, No. 
5833 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1994), reprinted in 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 28, at 
588, 730. 
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to overcome any reasonable doubt they might have about the 
defendant’s guilt. Because few things in life are more than 
99.99% certain, some jurors may believe that the statistical 
evidence in itself provides near certain (and hence sufficient) 
proof of guilt.  
III. THE “NEUTRAL” PRIOR PROBABILITY ASSUMPTION:  
GRIFFITH V. STATE  
The inverse errors that arose in McDaniel are not unusual in 
cases involving DNA evidence. A similar set of statistical errors 
were identified and documented in DNA cases in the early 
1990s.48 Perhaps the most worrisome part about these errors is 
that they are often expressly defended by experts and courts as 
mathematically proper. Consider Griffith v. State.49 In Griffith, 
the defendant was charged with raping a profoundly retarded 
patient at a state psychiatric hospital after the sexually inactive 
patient became pregnant and had a baby.50 In support of its 
charge, the prosecution called the director of a Fort Worth–based 
DNA laboratory to testify about the statistical significance of a 
paternity DNA match.51 The DNA expert planned to present a 
LR of 14,961 (described as a “paternity index”) to describe the 
significance of the DNA match.52 He also planned to testify that, 
by using what he referred to as a “neutral” 0.5 prior probability 
of paternity, the probability that the putative father was the father 
of the baby in question was greater than 99.99%.53 
The defense objected to the introduction of the 0.5 prior 
probability as well as the computation of a probability of 
paternity that relied on this prior. I was the defense expert in this 
case. In a preliminary hearing, I testified that the use of the 0.5 
prior probability was neither neutral nor an appropriate matter of 
speculation for the forensic scientist. Instead, I argued that the 
                                                          
48 Koehler, supra note 23, at 28–31. 
49 Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
50 Id. at 242. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 243–44. 
53 Id. at 245. 
530 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
prior probability should reflect the strength of the nongenetic 
evidence in the case as determined by the finders of fact. I 
suggested that the academic literature strongly supported my 
position and that the use of 0.5 as a “neutral assumption” was 
not generally accepted in the knowledgeable scientific 
community. Relatedly, I argued that it was inappropriate for the 
forensic scientist to offer a “probability of paternity” by using 
Bayes’ theorem to combine a 0.5 prior probability with a LR of 
14,961. I suggested that the method of using a 0.5 prior 
probability amounts to an attempt to legitimate an inverse fallacy 
by turning the LR into a posterior odds ratio. Finally, I 
suggested that a posterior probability of paternity that is 
computed in this manner could mislead the jury about the 
strength and meaning of the genetic evidence.  
The trial judge rejected my arguments, admitted the DNA 
expert’s testimony in full, and the defendant was convicted of 
sexual assault. The verdict was appealed to the Texas Seventh 
Court of Appeals on the grounds that the 0.5 prior probability 
violated the defendant’s right to be presumed innocent until 
proven otherwise.54  
The defense called the court’s attention to a 1994 
Connecticut Supreme Court opinion, State v. Skipper, in which 
the court rejected Bayesian computations in paternity cases that 
relied on a 0.5 prior probability.55 In rejecting Skipper, the 
Texas appellate court mischaracterized Skipper as having argued 
that that the probability of paternity statistic assumes that the 
putative father did, in fact, have sex with the mother rather than 
may have had sex with the mother. Skipper did not rely on this 
argument.56 Instead, Skipper argued that the introduction of an 
                                                          
54 Id. at 242. 
55 State v. Skipper, 637 A.2d 1101, 1107–08 (Conn. 1994). 
56 In fact, the court in Skipper noted that:  
[The probability of paternity computation was] predicated on an 
assumption that there was a fifty–fifty chance that sexual intercourse 
had occurred in order to prove that sexual intercourse had in fact 
occurred. The fifty–fifty assumption that sexual intercourse had 
occurred was not predicated on the evidence in the case but was 
simply an assumption made by the expert. 
Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). 
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arbitrary 50% prior probability of paternity violated the 
presumption of innocence.57 The Texas appellate court ultimately 
defended the 0.5 prior probability assumption because it is 
frequently used58 and “neutral.”59  
The views of the Texas appellate court on the legitimacy of 
using Bayes’ theorem to convert a LR into a posterior odds ratio 
by assuming a prior of 0.5 are not unique. Earlier this year, 
another appellate court cited the Griffith court’s arguments 
favorably.60 However, it is far from clear that either of these 
courts understood the underlying math. Both courts claim that 
Bayes’ theorem is “required” to convert probabilities into 
percentages.61 This is not true. As noted earlier, one in 
3,000,000 may be described as a probability (.00000033) or as a 
percentage (.000033%). The conversion of a probability into a 
percentage is accomplished simply by multiplying the probability 
by 100 and then placing a “%” at the end of the result. Bayes’ 
theorem has nothing to do with it. Bayes’ theorem is a formula 
that tells decision makers how their prior beliefs about, say, a 
putative father’s paternity, should change in response to new 
evidence (such as a particular DNA result). It tells decision 
makers how to move from the probability that a hypothesis is 
true, to the probability that a hypothesis is true given new 
information.  
                                                          
57 “[W]hen the probability of paternity statistic is introduced, an 
assumption is required to be made by the jury before it has heard all of the 
evidence—that there is a quantifiable probability that the defendant committed 
the crime.” Id. at 1107–08. 
58 “[M]illions of HLA and DNA tests around the nation reported 
paternity results using Bayes’ Theorem and the probability of paternity 
invoking a .5 prior probability.” Griffith, 976 S.W.2d at 246. 
59 “The use of a prior probability of .5 is a neutral assumption. The 
statistic merely reflects the application of a scientifically accepted 
mathematical theorem which in turn is an expression of the expert’s opinion 
testimony.” Id. at 247. 
60 Jessop v. State, 368 S.W.3d 653, 669 n.19, 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2012). 
61 Id. at 669 n.19 (“Bayes’ Theorem uses a mathematical formula to 
determine conditional probabilities and is necessary to convert probabilities 
into percentages.”); Griffith, 976 S.W.2d at 243 (“Bayes’ Theorem is 
necessary to convert probabilities into percentages.”). 
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IV. ERROR RATES 
The previous two sections documented statistical errors 
associated with DNA evidence (inverse errors and flawed prior 
probability assumptions, respectively). One possible response to 
these errors is to claim that they are inconsequential. According 
to this argument, even if it is improper to translate a DNA RMP 
of one in 3,000,000 in McDaniel to a source probability of 
99.999967%, the extremely small RMP still justifies a strong 
belief that the matching defendant is, in fact, the source of the 
recovered DNA evidence. Similarly, even if paternity experts are 
not justified in assuming a 0.5 prior probability of paternity for 
all putative fathers, the extreme LRs that are commonly observed 
in paternity cases should give the fact finder confidence that the 
putative father is indeed the father of the child in question. 
It is true that source probability errors and unjustifiable 
assumptions about prior probabilities are less significant when 
RMPs and corresponding LRs are extreme. However, the 
Prosecutor’s Fallacy, wherein the RMP is equated with P(Not 
Guilty | Match), remains a significant concern when the RMP is 
extremely small. Even if one infers, from an extremely small 
RMP, that the matchee is the source of the evidence, this 
inference should not prompt the additional inference that the 
matchee must have committed the crime in question. The 
matchee may be the source of the trace evidence in question, but 
he or she may not have committed the crime. The trace evidence 
may have been deposited by the matchee either before or after 
the crime was committed. Alternatively, the matchee’s DNA may 
have been deposited by the perpetrator himself, either 
intentionally (as part of a frame up effort) or unintentionally 
(through inadvertent transfer). In short, those who commit the 
Prosecutor’s Fallacy in cases that include very small RMPs may 
be relying on weak or irrelevant evidence to justify belief in a 
defendant’s guilt. 
In DNA match cases that include very small RMPs, a 
different consideration should take center stage when gauging the 
probative value of the evidence: the risk of false positive error.62 
                                                          
62 Depending on the facts of the case, the risk that the true source is a 
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Simply put, the probative value of a DNA match is capped by 
the frequency with which false positive errors occur.63 It makes 
no difference if the RMP is one in millions, billions, or even 
septillions64: if the probability that an analyst will erroneously 
report a match on two nonmatching DNA samples is 1 in 500, 
then the corresponding LR is, at best, 500:1.65 In other words, 
the false positive error rate—rather than the RMP—tells us most 
of what we need to know about the probative value of a DNA 
match. With this in mind, we must ask ourselves whether it pays 
to risk confusion and various inverse errors by providing fact 
finders with the RMP at all. Elsewhere I have suggested that in 
cases where the RMP is several orders of magnitude smaller than 
the false positive error rate (e.g., RMP = 1 in 1,000,000; false 
positive error rate = 1 in 500), that the answer is no.66 There is 
no need to provide the RMP in such cases because it does not 
contribute anything beyond the false positive error rate in terms 
of helping jurors understand a fact in evidence.67  
What should jurors be told in cases like the one described 
above? They should be told something like this:  
The suspect reportedly matches the DNA evidence found 
at the crime scene. The chance that we would report such 
a match on nonmatching samples, either because of a 
coincidence or because of an error, is approximately one 
in 500.  
                                                          
close relative of the matchee may also be an important consideration. 
However, as DNA matches are based on more and more loci (currently, 
about thirteen loci), this risk fades considerably. See generally NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 3-12. 
63 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and 
Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
1077, 1079 (2008) (“[T]he false positive error rate limits and controls the 
probative value of the match report.”). 
64 People v. Odom, No. B225910, 2011 WL 5121175, at *5 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Oct. 31, 2011) (“[The state’s DNA expert] testified that two in 24 
septillion people . . . would be expected to match that profile.”). 
65 Recall that the LR is approximately the inverse of the RMP (i.e., 
1/RMP). See supra text accompanying note 14. 
66 Koehler et al., supra note 11, at 210. 
67 The Federal Rules of Evidence require that expert testimony be helpful 
to the trier of fact. FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
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Again, the RMP of 1 in 1,000,000 contributes nothing of 
value beyond this. Indeed, this RMP might actually promote 
confusion by inviting jurors to commit one of the fallacies 
described previously. Or it might tempt them to commit other 
errors such as averaging the RMP with the error rate, or 
ignoring the error rate altogether based on a mistaken belief that 
the RMP is the more relevant statistic. Empirical data showing 
that fact finders are improperly influenced by RMPs in these 
situations68 support the argument that introduction of RMPs can 
be more harmful than beneficial. 
At this point, one might wonder whether forensic science 
statistics of all sorts should simply be hidden from fact finders 
altogether. Perhaps we should let the forensic scientists handle 
the numbers in their laboratories but then have those same 
experts offer more qualitative opinions sans numerical data at 
trial. The truth is that forensic science testimony rarely includes 
a quantitative component outside of the DNA context. Non-DNA 
forensic scientists commonly offer their opinions about who or 
what is the source of the forensic science evidence (e.g., a hair, 
a shoeprint, a tire track, a bite mark, a fingerprint, a fiber, etc.). 
In some domains, forensic scientists use vague terms such as 
“consistent with,” “match,” and “could have come from” to 
explain their failure to find critical differences between two 
hairs, two fingerprints, etc. The central problem with such terms 
is that they lack consensus meaning. Two hairs may be 
“consistent with” one another because they are both brown and 
thick. Or they may be consistent with one another because they 
share a large collection of rare features. Without more 
information about the size of the set of included and excluded 
features, fact finders may find it hard to assign weight to 
qualitative terms.  
V. LINGUISTIC MESS: PRELIMINARY HEARING 
In some forensic areas (e.g., fingerprints and shoeprints), 
forensic scientists resort to strong language to report their 
opinions, referring to matches as “identifications” and 
                                                          
68 Koehler et al., supra note 11, at 210–11. 
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“individualizations.”69 Some experts use those two words 
interchangeably to indicate that the matching person or object is 
the one and only possible source of the marking to the exclusion 
of all others in the world. Indeed, phrases such as “to the 
exclusion of all others in the world” are commonly used by 
forensic scientists in many non-DNA disciplines to declare their 
opinions about who or what is the source of an evidentiary 
item.70  
Recently, some examiners have tried to distinguish between 
the words “individualization” and “identification” by suggesting 
that individualization is a factual state of the world whereas an 
identification is merely the opinion of the examiner. Consider the 
following cross-examination of a respected fingerprint examiner 
in a 2008 preliminary hearing on the admissibility of fingerprint 
evidence: 
Q: Okay. And by comparing the unknown prints to the 
known prints, you hope to either declare an 
individualization or an exclusion between the unknown 
and the known, correct? 
A: Well, when you say individualization and it’s kind of 
a—when I come to my result, I’m actually referring to 
that as an identification. Individualization, the scientific 
community, kind of the international, it’s ah, more along 
the lines of excluding it to the possibility of all others on 
the face of the earth. But when we say an 
identification . . . . I am telling you that I am confident 
that that latent print was made by this particular person. 
Q: And that is, meaning that particular individual? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So that would be an individualization; you’d be saying 
that this individual left that print? 
A: Ah, no. . . . [W]hen I say identification, it is my 
opinion and that I am confident in my result that this 
                                                          
69 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 454. 
70 See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization 
Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 206 (2008) 
(quoting United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 
2005)). 
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latent print and the known prints that I am comparing to 
were made by the same source. 
Q: Meaning that individual? 
A: No.71 
At the beginning of this exchange, the expert distinguishes an 
individualization from an identification, suggesting that his own 
identification conclusion is a mere statement about who he 
believes is the source of the prints, rather than a statement that 
excludes the possibility that anyone else on earth could be the 
source. But, in drawing this distinction, the expert appears to 
directly contradict himself. At first, he says “yes” in response to 
the attorney’s question about whether an identification means 
that a print was made by “that particular individual?” But 
seconds later, when the attorney repeats his question (“meaning 
that individual?”), the expert says “no.”72 
Trial transcripts are littered with confusing exchanges 
between attorneys and witnesses. Despite this, the exchange 
above is noteworthy both because the content is important and 
difficult and because this expert is so highly regarded. Although 
cross-examination has been referred to as “the greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,”73 cross-
examination often does not afford experts the opportunity to 
expand and clarify answers to complex issues. One can only 
imagine what the judge (or jury) would take away from the 
exchange above.  
CONCLUSION 
What does all of this mean for the burgeoning fields of 
forensic linguistics and authorship attribution? First, it means 
that these communities would be wise to set up clear and 
unambiguous standards for examining materials, documenting 
their findings, and reporting those findings in court. Doing so 
                                                          
71 Transcript of Proceedings at 48–49, State v. Hull, 788 N.W. 2d 91 
(Minn. 2010) (No. 48-CR-07-2336). 
72 Id. at 49. 
73 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 1367, at 32 (1974). 
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will help forensic linguists persuade courts that their evidence is 
based on reliable methods and will be helpful to jurors.74 At the 
very least, expert witnesses should examine materials in a 
common way, use agreed-upon standards for identifying and 
recording consistencies and inconsistencies in evidentiary 
materials, and use a common language to describe findings and 
conclusions to triers of fact. To facilitate these goals, the forensic 
linguistics community should establish a professional body that 
not only promotes these goals but also certifies experts and, 
where applicable, accredits training programs and laboratories. 
As indicated earlier, the forensics linguistics community 
appears to be divided on the question of whether it favors 
qualitative versus quantitative methods. Whereas forensic stylists 
favor the qualitative approach, computational linguists and 
computer scientists in the field favor a quantitative approach. 
Regardless of which approach prevails, the field will likely 
succeed or fail as a function of the scientific quality of its 
methods. This metric favors the quantitative approach, though 
the field will need to do a better job developing the requisite 
databases and transparent methodologies. In an analogous 
manner, some of the more traditional forensic sciences, such as 
fingerprinting and voiceprint analysis, are beginning to explore 
quantitative approaches.75 
Of course, dangers await. As the field moves toward more 
probabilistic analyses and outputs, inverse errors may be 
committed both in and out of the courtroom. It is therefore 
imperative that the forensic linguistics community identify clear 
and consistent standards for reporting and testifying about results 
                                                          
74 Scientific evidence must be reliable according to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). As 
noted previously, the Federal Rules of Evidence further require that expert 
testimony be helpful to the trier of fact. FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
75 Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to 
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 117–18 (2001); 
Geoffrey S. Morrison, Measuring the Validity and Reliability of Forensic 
Likelihood-Ratio Systems, 51 SCI. & JUST. 91 (2011) (quantifying the 
accuracy of forensic voice prints); Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of 
Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Any 
Number of Minutiae, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 54, 54–64 (2007). 
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and include training in elementary statistics and probability for 
its members. Regarding the latter recommendation, it is not 
enough that a forensic field has good scientific intentions and 
embraces rigorous scientific principles: expert witnesses who 
provide quantitative testimony must understand enough about 
statistics and probability to avoid, explain, and correct statistical 
misstatements when they arise. 
The forensic linguistics community should also support a 
rigorous proficiency-testing program, using realistic evidentiary 
items, for all techniques and experts. Participation in the 
program, which should be conducted by an external agency that 
does not have an interest in demonstrating positive outcomes, 
should be mandatory for courtroom testimony.76 Such tests can 
alert the field and the courts to strengths and weaknesses 
associated with various techniques and can provide reasonable 
first-pass estimates for relevant error rates.  
Finally, forensic linguistics can learn from the recent battles 
waged over the individualization claims made by fingerprint 
examiners.77 As the exchange in State v. Hull documented in 
Section V indicates, some examiners recognize that 
individualization claims reach beyond the available data in most 
                                                          
76 Jonathan J. Koehler, Proficiency Tests to Estimate Error Rates in the 
Forensic Sciences, 12 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 89 (2013); Michael J. Saks & 
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification 
Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 893–94 (2005). Some of the traditional non-DNA 
forensic sciences appear to be moving in this direction. A recent Expert 
Working Group report on latent print examination recommended a similar 
testing program for fingerprint examiners. EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON 
HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, LATENT PRINT EXAMINATION 
AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 187–88 (David H. Kaye ed., 2012). 
77 See generally Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, 
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic 
Identification, 8 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 233 (2009); Simon A. Cole, Who 
Speaks for Science? A Response to the National Academy of Sciences Report 
on Forensic Science, 9 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 25 (2010); Jonathan J. 
Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: 
Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187 (2010); Saks & Koehler, supra 
note 70. But see David H. Kaye, Probability, Individualization, and 
Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence: Listening to the Academies, 75 
BROOK. L. REV. 1163 (2010). 
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(if not all) forensic sciences. Forensic linguistics would do well 
to offer conservative, descriptive claims and to support those 
claims with empirical data. Source claims (e.g., “In my opinion, 
this text was written by the defendant”) should be avoided. Such 
a modest approach will not only help forensic linguistics gain a 
place in the courtroom, but it will also reduce the risk that 
jurors will overweigh this potentially important, but as yet 
untested, evidence. 
